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Abstract: In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on cam-
paign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political 
activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the 
fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the litera-
ture which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call 
this neglected activity “asset freezing”: situations in which firms delay lay-offs or 
invest in specific technologies to support local politicians’ re-election objectives. 
In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of 
their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building 
on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm’s economic 
assets can be evaluated based on their degree of “political freezability,” which 
depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We 
then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets 
are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-mak-
ing, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.
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1  Introduction
In a famous piece written over 40 years ago, Gordon Tullock raised the follow-
ing question: If the value of public policies can be high for many firms, why is 
there so little money in US politics? (Tullock 1967, 1972). This question remains 
known today as the “Tullock paradox” and has not been completely resolved 
by the economics, political science or management literatures (Ansolabehere, 
de  Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Bonardi 2008, 2011). In spite of the billions of 
dollars of public expenditure and regulatory costs imposed on firms in the US, 
campaign contributions remain relatively low. Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 
(2000), for instance, studied 15 large corporations in 1998. The firms in their 
sample gave $1611 million to charities and just $16 million to political campaigns. 
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Candidates and party committees raised nearly $3 billion during the 1999–2000 
election cycle.1 However, only about $380 million of those $3 billion came directly 
from corporations. In addition, only 60% of the Fortune 500 companies have 
Public Action Committees (PACs), a number that should probably be considered 
as surprisingly low if political activities are truly a superior way to acquire regula-
tory rents.
A traditional treatment of the Tullock paradox is developed around the idea 
of rent dissipation, according to which political competition among firms would 
push these firms to use as much resources as possible to get the rent related to 
a public policy decision, in which case most of the value of the rent would be 
dissipated in the form of resources used up in the competition for that rent (Dari-
Mattiacci and Parisi 2005). However, empirical studies of the phenomenon have 
not backed up that proposition. Hazlett and Michaels (1993) estimate that, in the 
FCC cellular telephone bandwidth lotteries, approximately 38% of the rents were 
dissipated by the expenses associated with the preparation of applications – a 
significant proportion, certainly, but far from full dissipation. Similarly, consider 
the case of sugar producers highlighted by Stratmann (1991), in which a “$3000 
sugar PAC contribution maps into a yes vote with almost certainty.” Stratmann 
argues that without sugar industry contributions, the final vote on the sugar 
amendment to the 1985 agriculture bill would have been 203–210, effectively 
ending the sugar subsidy, but contributions helped the subsidy to survive: the 
final vote was 267–146. A US General Accounting Office (1993) study values the 
annual transfer from consumers to sugar producers and processors at $1.1 billion 
a year from 1989 to 1991. In other words, $192,000 in contributions in 1985 bought 
more than $5 billion for the industry over a 5-year period (Ansolabehere, Snyder, 
and Tripathi 2002), very far from dissipating rents.
So why do not firms invest more in political activities? In this paper, we argue 
that part of the paradox can be explained by the fact that some influential and 
costly political activities that firms adopt to impact public-policy decisions have 
not been taken into account in previous literature. To make this argument, we 
build on the Resource-Based View of the firm (Barney 1991) according to which 
there is heterogeneity among firms based on a set of resources and capabilities 
that are specific to each firm and which other firms cannot easily acquire, imitate 
or replicate. Several scholars have already applied the Resource-Based View of 
the firm to the domain of corporate political activities (Dahan 2005a; Oliver and 
Holzinger 2008; Holburn and Zelner 2010; Lawton and Rajwani 2011), and have 
1 These numbers and many other interesting ones can be found in Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, 
and Snyder (2003).
Asset freezing and the Tullock paradox      277
attempted to identify the types of resources and capabilities that might be rel-
evant in that context. Questions remain, however, about what corporate political 
resources really provide a competitive edge to certain firms, and why firms cannot 
acquire the political capabilities they need by hiring lobbyists or contracting with 
lobbying firms (Bonardi 2011). In this paper, we argue that firms can create spe-
cific political resources through their existing economic assets.
More specifically, we put the focus on a type of activity that we call “asset 
freezing” and that only firms – in contrast to other interest groups – can develop. 
We define asset freezing as a business action whereby the firm sacrifices profits 
in a way that is politically beneficial to an incumbent government. This type of 
political activity can include a broad range of practices, such as delaying lay-offs 
(Bertrand et al., 2006), anticipating increased employment, adopting “politically 
friendly” technologies, acquiring inputs from suppliers at higher than market 
prices, etc.2 Three situations might fall into the boundaries of what we call asset 
freezing here. First, a situation in which a firm plans to invest in a project for 
economic reasons, but over-invests for political reasons. Second, a situation in 
which a firm invests in a project whereas it would not have done so if politics was 
not a factor. Third, a situation in which a firm is considering downsizing or shut-
ting down a unit or facility, but delays it for political reasons. In all three cases, 
the firm freezes economic assets in order to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis 
policy-makers and make its lobbying more effective.
One enlightening example of asset freezing (non-monetary campaign con-
tribution) recently occurred in Argentina and was uncovered by Wikileaks (as 
published by Diario El País of Spain and reproduced by local newspapers in 
Argentina). Prior to the 2007 presidential election, the incumbent government 
(headed by president Néstor Kirchner) struck an agreement with local banks by 
which the latter would offer very cheap loans to the general public (in particu-
lar, to buy real estate) in order to favor the electoral chances of the incumbent’s 
presidential candidate (Néstor Kirchner’s wife Cristina Fernández). The astonish-
ing revelations by Wikileaks, reproducing diplomatic reports produced by the US 
embassy in Buenos Aires, point out that the arrangement was not really supposed 
to be implemented beyond the very short run, as the government was particularly 
interested in the announcement of cheap loans prior to the election, not their 
2 We assume that opposite actions such as anticipation of layoffs, overdependence on less com-
petitive imports, etc., which would deteriorate the domestic environment and thus relatively 
favor entrants, are not feasible because they would be understood as sabotage against the coun-
try (and would entail both legal and/or enormous reputational risks) and because there are no 
institutional opportunities for such a type of negotiated contributions (as happens with govern-
ment officials in office who regulate and regularly meet with managers of various firms).
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eventual completion afterwards. This episode, then, contains a crude and recent 
illustration that campaign contributions are not always monetary, and that the 
incumbent government running for reelection is in a better position to receive 
in-kind contributions.3
Compared to campaign contributions, asset freezing practices have three 
specific characteristics. First, from a competitive standpoint, they generate cor-
porate political resources that are much more difficult to imitate. Campaign con-
tributions are pure monetary investments and, as such, are easy to imitate for 
competitors. On the other hand, assets frozen will be more specific to one firm 
and can generate a competitive advantage as suggested by the Resource-Based 
View (Barney 1991).
Second, “asset freezing-based” resources benefit mainly political incum-
bents and can therefore only be used by firms that want to influence incumbent 
politicians. Asset freezing therefore differs from campaign contributions, which 
are monetary transfers made at a precise moment in time and which can be 
received both by political incumbents and new entrants. The reason for this is 
that the benefits of asset freezing are always attributed by voters to the govern-
ment in function. If lay-offs are delayed by firms in one region in the context of an 
asset freezing strategy, the politicians who will benefit from it in the eyes of the 
public will be incumbent politicians. Whereas money (campaign financing) can 
help both political competitors to get elected, asset freezing will support only the 
efforts of the incumbent.4
Third, asset freezing practices carry specific types of costs. By freezing assets, 
at least in the short-term, firms accept to be less competitive than they could be. 
In other words, firms support an internal cost related to their productive activities, 
whereas campaign contributions are external to the firms’ productive activities. 
The magnitude of this cost will vary depending on the type of sector the firms 
belong to and the types of assets considered for freezing. The more competitive or 
technologically dynamic the sector, the higher the internal cost associated with 
asset freezing. Similarly, the more flexible the asset, i.e., the lower the cost to 
increase or decrease investment related to the asset, the more we should observe 
asset freezing compared to other political means (such as campaign contributions).
In this paper, we provide a first exploration of asset freezing in several ways, 
with the objective of paving the way for future research on the topic. First, we 
3 Source: http://www.ambito.com/noticia.asp?id = 568184.
4 Note that we assume here that no credible promise or commitment can be made by firms or 
interest groups when they attempt to influence policy-makers. Both asset freezing and campaign 
contributions are to be made and consumed right away.
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offer a conceptual discussion of how a firm’s economic assets, and which assets, 
might be frozen in order to create a corporate political resource. Second, in order 
to explore the trade-offs involved for a firm, we offer a stylized model in which a 
firm can use both campaign contributions and asset freezing to influence policy-
making. Contributions can be provided to either an incumbent politician or a new 
entrant, who compete to be elected. Results of the model highlight when asset 
freezing will be chosen over campaign contributions, and explain why large firms 
are more likely to use this type of political instrument.
2  Asset freezing and corporate political resources
Several authors, looking at firms operating in regulated markets (Bonardi et al., 
2006) or more generally attempting to influence public policies (Schuler 1996), 
argue that a critical aspect to consider is whether these firms possess specific 
political resources, i.e., a set of unique assets and skills that might allow these 
firms to participate in policy debates, face the rivalry of competing interest groups, 
and effectively shape policy decisions (Dean and Brown 1995; Hillman et al. 1999; 
Baron 2003; Hillman 2005; Faccio 2006). Similar to the Resource Based View 
of the firm (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), which holds that a firm’s resources that 
are idiosyncratic and valuable may result in sustained competitive advantage, it 
has thus been argued that firms, in many cases, can also develop specific politi-
cal resources with similar attributes (Keim and Baysinger 1988). This literature 
identifies corporate political resources of various kinds such as knowledge and 
expertise of political processes (Holburn and Zelner 2010), reputation and politi-
cal capital (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985), or stakeholder support (Rehbein and 
Schuler forthcoming). Dahan (2005b), however, suggests that corporate politi-
cal resources are often composed of a bundle of resources, combining various 
aspects which might even include economic resources and capabilities. Our asset 
freezing approach follows a similar intuition. Corporate political resources do not 
only build on political attributes, but also on a firm’s economic attributes, in that 
case in freezing some of its assets to acquire political influence.
Our asset freezing concept speaks to two different ideas previously developed 
in the literature. First, it offers a development of the idea that firms integrate their 
market and nonmarket strategies (Baron 1995), i.e., that economic and political 
activities should be complementary to each other in many industries in which 
public policies or regulations impact outcomes. Here, we push this idea further 
by suggesting that, at the basis of this integration, one could find common asset 
investments.
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Second, and relatedly, the asset freezing concept is in line with what Dahan 
(2005b) calls the “dual purpose” of assets: many assets have not only economic 
value for firms, but can also hold political value. What we suggest here, however, 
is that generating this value might require actions that are not always comple-
mentary with productivity enhancing behaviors for firms. In other words, the 
integration of market and nonmarket activities, in spite of the dual purpose of 
assets, might not always be without costs. The question remains, however, of 
which economic assets could be frozen and could help in the context of a firm’s 
political strategy. In what follows, we develop a conceptual framework to address 
this question. Following Ghemawat and del Sol (1998), a firm’s assets can be cat-
egorized based on whether they are flexible or not (horizontal axis), and whether 
they have political value or not (vertical axis). We define the flexibility of an asset 
as indicating how costly it is for this firm to increase or decrease its investment in 
the asset. This includes both barriers to entry and barriers to exit (as in the notion 
of irreversibility). In other words, we define a politically flexible asset as an asset 
that a firm can both easily invest in and in which it is less costly to disinvest. From 
that definition, for instance, a firm’s workforce is an asset that is more flexible 
than an investment in a high technology plant.
The other dimension indicates how political valuable an asset might be. This 
obviously depends highly on the context, and on the preferences of policy-mak-
ers. With governments elected based on a program focused on reducing pollu-
tion, for instance, a project to invest in a green technology will constitute a very 
valuable political asset for a firm, and will increase this firm’s bargaining chips 
with the government.
From there, assets that are the most attractive for firms to freeze are those 
that are both flexible and politically valuable. Figure 1 represents this typology, 
and provides examples of the different kinds of assets. In the top left quadrant, a 
firm’s asset has the lowest freezability potential as it has low political value and 
low flexibility. An example of this would be an investment project in a R&D labo-
ratory in a foreign country. An R&D lab is an asset that is not flexible – the exit 
cost is high once the investment is made – and, if made in a foreign country, this 
asset loses much of its political value for the home government of the company. 
Conversely, a workforce investment project in a region with high unemployment 
generates high freezability potential as it is both flexible – the firm can adjust 
how many people will be temporarily employed and then easily lay them off 
afterwards – and highly valuable politically if unemployment is a key political 
election issue in that region. Asset freezing in that case should provide strong 
political resources to the firm making the investment.
The two other quadrants represent mixed solutions. In the top right, the 
investment project has high political value but low flexibility, making it more of 
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a long-term political commitment for a firm rather than asset freezing. An invest-
ment in a green production technology is an example of this. The asset involved 
would certainly create bargaining power with policy-makers upfront, but would 
not be very adjustable for the firm afterwards. In that case, this would be part of 
a long-term political investment strategy rather than asset freezing, and would 
likely jeopardize the firm’s financial health on the long-run. In the bottom left, 
the investment project would be a flexible asset, but have low political value. 
A firm’s investment in its marketing and advertising unit would constitute such 
an asset with limited freezability potential as it would be unlikely to be of much 
interest for policy-makers.
3   A model of asset freezing and campaign 
contribution
In what follows, we develop a formal model that accounts for the decision by a 
firm to trade-off campaign contributions and asset freezing. The purpose of this 
model is two-fold. First, we wish to explore in more details the trade-offs between 
asset freezing and another kind of political resource, in that case campaign 
contribution. Second, and despite its limitations, the model provides a method 
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Figure 1 Determining asset freezability.
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through which asset freezing could be studied in future research. For instance, 
the model does not include competition among firms, but the approach devel-
oped here could be extended to study this type of rivalry.
3.1  Model assumptions
The model considers the case of a firm that has to decide on two political instru-
ments (campaign contributions and asset freezing), in different possible envi-
ronments (parameters), potentially facing different politicians in the relevant 
short-term horizon (incumbent government in office and potential entrant).
Each one of the two next possible governments maximizes utility attached to 
votes, reached both by long-term efficient policies and short-term monetary and 
non-monetary resources available to improve the way these politicians and their 
policies are perceived by voters.
The timing of the model is the following: nature moves and chooses the envi-
ronment, including the probability – perceived by the individual firms – that the 
incumbent politicians remain in office in the short-term (with different proba-
bilities off-election times and at-election times); the firm then chooses its contri-
butions to the two potential government officials (incumbent and entrant), as a 
contract in exchange for a specific regulation favoring its private performance/
market profit; based on those contracts, the winning candidate implements the 
short-term regulatory agreement struck with the contributing firm.
The solution is found backwards. Conditional on the information disclosed 
by nature (N), the firm (F) maximizes its expected profit anticipating the optimal 
reaction of the two possible political candidates (G) who will be in office in the 
near future, where the transaction can be enforced based on reputation. In other 
words, the politicians’ problems are solved first, and their reaction functions are 
introduced into the firm’s maximization problem.
The policy space is the “level of regulation,” ordered with increasing value 
when it moves to benefit the lobbying firm, as shown in Figure 2. This figure con-
siders only one possible type of government official G, choosing between the 
spontaneous/unbiased policy – the one he considers to be first-best, RFB – and 
the policy that maximizes the private profits reached by the lobbying firm, Rmax.
RFB R* (solves G’s problem) Rmax
Figure 2 Policy space.
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3.2  Utility functions
The expected profit of the firm is denoted by E(π):
pi φpi φ pi= + − − − −( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ),M MI I E E I I I E EE R R C AF R S R S R  (1)
where
 – f is the probability that the incumbent official (I) remains in office during the 
next period (say, 2–4 years); while this probability is endogenous for politi-
cians when they plan their actions, the firm takes this probability as given 
by nature (exogenous regarding the amount of funds or support it offers to 
either government official),
 – πM denotes the market profit (gross of nonmarket expenditures), which 
depends on regulation R (RI and RE, respectively),
 – AF(RI) is the (economic) amount of assets frozen “transferred to” (i.e., 
invested to please) the incumbent politician in exchange for regulation RI,
 – C(AF(RI)) denotes the cost incurred by the firm to generate a transfer AF(RI) 
of frozen assets, and
 – SI(RI) and SE(RE) are the (monetary) campaign contributions to the incumbent 
and the entrant in exchange for policies RI and RE, respectively.
We adopt a specific market profit function, given by
 
pi =− × − 2( ) ( ) ,M maxi i iR z R R  (2)
for i = I, E, where z denotes the size of the firm (reaching higher gains when the 
regulation approaches the most beneficial one, defined as Rmax). We assume 
linear support contracts, so that
 
= × −( ) ( ),FBI I IAF R AF R R  (3)
 
= × −( ) ( ),FBI I I I IS R S R R  (4)
and
 
= × −( ) ( ),FBE E E E ES R S R R  (5)
where FBiR  represents the first-best policy for long-term efficiency as seen by gov-
ernment official i = I, E. This means that the firm offers marginal supports AF, SI 
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and SE for policies deviating from those that would (spontaneously) be adopted 
without such intervention.5
Regarding the function C(AF(RI)), we assume that there is a higher cost 
incurred by freezing assets when the firm’s assets are less flexible [a multiplying 
parameter D ( ≥  1) captures this effect], and that frozen assets involve a fixed trans-
action cost (because agreeing and measuring the contribution is more difficult), 
which is diluted as the level of the non-monetary transference is higher. This 
second effect would be captured by assuming that the unit cost of frozen assets is 
initially high and decreases in AF. Yet, for algebra simplicity, we choose to repre-
sent the unit cost as decreasing in the size (z) of the firm, which is positively cor-
related with all types of contributions, as its marginal benefit from policies closer 
to its preferred one increases in those cases. In short, a transfer ( )FBI IAF R R× −  
costs the firm ( )FBI I
D AF R R
z
 ×
× −   .
As for the two possible governments/politicians in office during the next 
short-term horizon, their utilities are generically defined as UI[X(RI), AF(RI), SI(RI)] 
for the incumbent and UE[X(RE), SE(RE)] for the potential entrant, where X(Ri) 
denotes efficiency motives and AF(R) and S(R) enter their utilities as instruments 
favoring their chances of winning the election. The incumbent government can 
receive frozen assets in exchange for less efficient regulation favoring the firm’s 
interest, but the entrant cannot.6
Considering the linear incentives assumed [whereby AF, SI and SE denote 
marginal exchanges per unit of Ri away from the first-best (i.e., closer to Rmax)], we 
also adopt specific utility (or loss) functions for the two potential governments, 
given by
α=− × − + − × × + ×2( ( ), , ) ( ) ( ) ( ),FB FB AF SI I I I I I I I I IU X R AF S R R R R U AF U S  (6)
and
α=− × − + − × ×2( ( ), ) ( ) ( ) ( ),FB FB SE E E E E E E E E EU X R S R R R R U S  (7)
5 If other firms were lobbying in various ways, FBiR  would just represent the firm’s expected 
policy when it offers no individual support to Gi.
6 We assume that negotiating to freeze assets with entrant politicians is impossible. We find this 
a natural assumption for two main reasons. First, incumbent politicians and firms have natural 
interactions overtime regarding the evolution of business, and these would help them overcome 
higher transaction costs attached to freezing assets. Second, altering economic decisions to favor 
entrants would entail some sort of sabotage to existing inputs (workforce in particular), which 
might be severely punished if detected, discouraging both firms and politicians in doing so.
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where αi denotes the importance given to (efficient) regulation by each poten-
tial government official, UAF denotes the marginal utility (votes) received by the 
incumbent government official out of freezing assets, and SiU  denotes govern-
ment i’s marginal utility from campaign contribution Si (with i = I, E).
The sequence is described as follows:
FIφ FE1-φ
G1 G2 G3 G4
N 
φ 1-φ
AF, SI , SE
R 
Nature chooses the government official for the following short-term period, 
but this choice is not observed by the firm, whose information set contains two 
decision nodes reached with probability f (current officials will remain in office) 
and 1-f (challenger will win the election). The firm, then, has to choose all of 
its political offers/contracts (AF, SI and SE) with the two potential future gov-
ernment officials. Once these contracts are signed and the choice of nature is 
revealed, the government, knowing perfectly where it is at – so that each one 
of the decision nodes for both the incumbent and the entrant coincides with an 
information set –, chooses policy RI (last two nodes on the left) or RE (last two 
nodes on the right).
4  Results
As mentioned above, the solution is computed backwards. The problem for each 
possible government official, characterized by the first-order conditions of their 
respective maximization problems, is solved first:
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α
× + ×
= +*
( ) ,
2
AF S
FBI I
I I
I
U AF U SR R
 
(8)
and
 
α
×
= +* .
2
S
FBE E
E E
E
U SR R
 
(9)
Second, the expected profit of the firm subject to these last two equations has 
to be maximized. The program is thus to choose AF, SI and SE in order to:
 
pi φ φ=− − − − −
− × − − × − − × −
2 2
*
max ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
max max
I E
FB FB FB
I I I I I E E E
E Z R R Z R R
D AF R R S R R S R R
z  
(10)
subject to
 
α
× + ×
= +*
( ) ,
2
AF S
FBI I
I I
I
U AF U SR R
 
(11)
and
 
α
×
= +* .
2
S
FBE E
E E
E
U SR R
 
(12)
The solution to this problem is characterized by three first-order conditions, 
with three unknowns (AF*, *IS  and 
*
ES ) taking values depending on 11 param-
eters: f, Rmax, FBIR , 
FB
ER , αI, αE, D, 
AF
IU , 
S
IU , 
S
EU , and Z.
To facilitate computations, we assume that FB FBI ER R=  and αI = αE.
4.1  Benchmark case: no frozen assets
Imposing AF = 0, the problem to be solved is the following: choose SI and SE to
 
pi φ φ=− − − − −
− × − − × −
2 2max ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
( ) ( ),
max max
I E
FB FB
I I E E
E Z R R Z R R
S R R S R R
 
(13)
subject to
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 α
×
= +* ,
2
S
FBI I
I
U SR R
 
(14)
and
 α
×
= +* .
2
S
FBE E
E
U SR R
 
(15)
The two first-order conditions for this problem are
 
φ
α α
− − − − − × =* *( ) ( ) 0,
2
S
S max FB I
I I I I
UZU R R R R S
 
(16)
and
 
φ
α α
−
− − − − − × =* *
( 1 ) ( ) ( ) 0,
2
S
S max FB E
E E E E
UZU R R R R S
 
(17)
which after rearranging terms result in
 
αφ
α φ
× −
=
+
* 2 ( ) ,
2
max FB
I S
I
z R RS
zU
 
(18)
and
 
α φ
α φ
− × −
=
+ −
* 2 ( 1 ) ( ) .
2 ( 1 )
max FB
E S
E
z R RS
zU
 
(19)
Thus, we can check the symmetry of the solution. *IS  and 
*
ES  respond posi-
tively to the size of the firm (z), to the probability of each party winning [f and 
(1-f), respectively], to the importance attached to first-best policy by the govern-
ment (α), and to the difference between the preferred policy and that considered 
to be the first-best by the politicians (Rmax–RFB). They respond negatively to gov-
ernments preferring campaign contributions (i.e., those with higher utility from 
money SIU  and 
S
EU ).
4.2  Equilibria in asset freezing
Referring back to the original problem, where asset freezing is an available instru-
ment, the solution to the firm’s maximization problem is characterized by the 
following three first-order conditions:
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φ
α α
− − − × − − × + × =* *( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
2
AF
AF max FB
I I I
Z D D UU R R R R AF S
z z  
(20)
 
φ
α α
− − − − − × + × =* *( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
2
S
S max FB I
I I I I
UZ DU R R R R AF S
z  
(21)
 
φ
α α
−
− − − − − × =* *
( 1 ) ( ) ( ) 0.
2
S
S max FB E
E E E E
UZU R R R R S
 
(22)
Since the first two equations can be rewritten as
 
φ
α α
− + × + =− × −* *
2{ ( ) ( )} ( ),
2
AF
max max
I I I
U Z D DR R AF S R R
z z  
(23)
and
 
φ
α α
− + × + =− −* *
2{ ( ) ( )} ( ),
2
S
max maxI
I I I
U Z DR R AF S R R
z  
(24)
they can hold together only if ,
AF
S
I
U D
zU
=  which indicates that AF* and *IS  will be 
both positive (and the firm will be indifferent between them) only when the ratio 
between the marginal utilities generated for the current government by transfers 
AF and SI is equal to the relative marginal cost of these instruments for the firm 
(D/z).
We can then identify three different equilibria depending on these parameters:
(i) if ,
AF
S
I
U D
zU
>  then *IS  equals zero, and the solutions for AF* and 
*
ES  are given 
by the first and third first-order conditions;
(ii) if ,
AF
S
I
U D
zU
<  then AF* equals zero, and the solutions for *IS  and 
*
ES  are given 
by the second and third first-order conditions (as in the benchmark case 
when AF is forced to be zero);
(iii) finally, if ,
AF
S
I
U D
zU
=  then the levels of AF* and *IS  remain indeterminate, but 
the third first-order condition together with any of the other two provides the 
solution for +* * .IAF S
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In case (i), imposing SI = 0, the solution to the maximization problem is given by:
 
αφ
α φ
× −
=
+
* 2 ( ) ,
2
max FB
AF
z R RAF
D zU
z  
(25)
and
 
α φ
α φ
− × −
=
+ −
* 2 ( 1 ) ( ) .
2 ( 1 )
max FB
E S
E
z R RS
zU
 
(26)
Thus, while *ES  remains as in the benchmark case, AF* is fairly similar to 
the benchmark solution for *IS , except that now its response to z is larger (as it 
now also enters dividing in the denominator), and there is a negative response to 
D. Compared with campaign contributions to politicians in office, frozen assets 
increase faster when the firms become larger, and decrease when the firm’s assets 
are less flexible, and thus the firm faces a higher cost for immobilizing inputs or 
choosing inputs of poor quality for political reasons.
More generally, looking at the three possible solutions together, the chances 
of finding the use of frozen assets decrease with D and increase with z:
(i) For less flexible assets, where the long-lasting effect of irreversible contribu-
tions for lobbying is higher, firms are less likely to use frozen assets as a lob-
bying instrument, whereas
(ii) Larger firms, which can dilute higher transaction costs as their contributions 
become larger, are also expected to freeze assets more frequently than small 
firms.
Regarding the relationship with size, the same pattern would be true in countries 
or institutional areas where (monetary) campaign contributions are limited and 
become binding restrictions for lobbying. Since the optimal levels of transfers of 
any kind, but particularly money, are higher when the firms become larger, such 
legal constraint would be more binding for larger firms because they use frozen 
assets more frequently.7
7 Notice that our model considers the problem faced by one firm, and thus cannot capture in-
teractions between firms whereby they might coordinate contributions or compete for political 
favours. While this is a relevant limitation, and in particular we agree with one referee on the im-
portance of capturing potential free-riding problems, we believe that such questions are equally 
relevant regarding monetary campaign contributions. Thus, sectors characterized by larger firms 
(and higher concentration ratios), and facing lower international competition (low contestability) 
would be in a better shape to avoid free-riding of individual firms on lobbying activities, both 
monetary campaign contributions and asset freezing ones. But, in any case, our model highlights 
the differential influence of firm size and sector regarding the latter – because of the higher trans-
action cost involved in measuring them and the inability to provide them to challenger politicians.
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5  Conclusions
This article sets out to provide a first and primary exploration of asset freezing 
as a corporate political resource, and how this concept could help explain the 
Tullock paradox. This paper provides a conceptual discussion of which economic 
assets could be frozen for political reasons, and puts the focus on two key dimen-
sions: the political value and the flexibility of a firm’s political asset. The article 
then develops a simple theoretical model looking at the trade-off between asset 
freezing and campaign contributions as political resources. In this model, firms 
as part of political transactions or lobbying efforts not only offer financial contri-
butions to both incumbent and entrant politicians but also distort their produc-
tive decisions to generate political benefits to incumbents heading to an election. 
The decision to contribute with in kind or financial transfers emerges from an 
optimization process where each firm compares the marginal benefits and costs 
of both alternatives regarding their expected effect on policy.
The first main empirical implication of our model is that such non-financial 
contributions should be expected by large firms (the only ones which can reach a 
scale sufficient enough to overcome fixed transaction costs to detect and measure 
“in kind contributions”). The second implication is that since they are substi-
tutes with financial contributions, but can only be offered to incumbent politi-
cians, they should coexist with larger financial contributions for entrants than for 
incumbents once the likelihood of each party winning the election is controlled 
for. Regarding this second implication, large firms should tend to offer relatively 
higher financial contributions to political entrants than to incumbents vis-à-vis 
the corresponding contributions offered by smaller firms.
Our approach provides a new explanation for the famous Tullock paradox. 
We show that campaign contributions are not necessarily an efficient way for 
firms to influence policy-making, even in an environment where these firms can 
do so with no restrictions. In certain situations, asset freezing – adopting costly 
business decisions benefiting incumbent politicians towards an election – can be 
a more efficient strategic option. Consider for instance employment decisions by 
firms of various sizes and belonging to different sectors. Larger firms in sectors 
with lower incidence of labor costs – who thus presumably are more capable 
of absorbing the fixed transaction cost of subtle in kind contributions – should 
create more net jobs prior to political elections, vis-à-vis smaller firms in sectors 
with high labor costs. This could be tested empirically in future research.
Note that this approach is also a new way to explore the idea proposed by 
Baron (2001), i.e., that firms strategically integrate market and nonmarket strategies 
(Bonardi 1999, 2004). Instead of just considering this question by studying the com-
plementarity between firms’ economic and political activities, we suggest here that 
similar assets might be the pillars of both activities. This creates clear opportunities 
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for firms to differentiate in political environments, as different firms might freeze dif-
ferent types of assets. However, this also comes with constraints (Bonardi 2008). As 
indicated in our formal model, firms operating in more competitive or more dynamic 
industries will face a potentially significant cost when engaging in asset freezing, 
something that will limit the overall effectiveness of this type of political strategy.
The solution to the Tullock paradox proposed here is also compatible with 
other well-known tendencies of firm political behavior, such as the fact that 
governments tend to favor declining industries (Brainard and Verdier 1997) 
and “losers” over winners in general (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007). Our 
approach suggests that becoming a loser might be endogenous to the political 
game or, expressed differently, might be a choice by certain firms which focus on 
asset freezing as a way to influence public policy decisions.
Beyond contributing to the debate on political spending and contributing to 
the study of how firms develop political resources, our approach has important 
institutional and public policy implications. On the one hand, our framework 
suggests that democracy does not generate as much political competition as is 
often expected. Since asset freezing is asymmetric (it favors political incumbents 
vis-à-vis new entrants), jurisdictions that have large firms provide a very large 
advantage to incumbent politicians versus new entrants.
Second, our framework has implications for policy. It suggests that laws regu-
lating lobbying and campaign contributions can only be partially efficient since 
there are other important vectors (probably more costly than campaign contri-
butions) through which firms invest (Bonardi 2008). As these behaviors are not 
regulated, but encouraged by incumbent politicians, it is questionable whether 
lobbying regulation is really effective. These laws tend to constrain resources to 
which most interest groups have access, but leave untouched areas that favor 
certain firms and certain politicians over others.
Our paper has clear limitations, however, and should mostly be seen as a first 
step in exploring asset freezing as a corporate political resource. We hope to stimulate 
further research in a number of ways. First, we have left untouched the question of 
competitive interactions in the context of asset freezing. What happens when two 
firms – or more – compete to influence policy-making and use asset freezing? The 
answer to this question is far from obvious and certainly warrants more research. 
Second, we have compared here asset freezing with one type of corporate political 
behavior, i.e., campaign contribution. How does asset freezing interact with other 
political resources, such as strategic information or grass-root support? Last, it would 
be interesting to study asset freezing with a more complete model of government 
behavior, especially one in which reelection is endogenous. We hope to have stimu-
lated enough interest in these questions, and leave them open for future research.
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